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Abstract. This paper concerns with the construction of codes over
GF (2) which reach the max-flow for single source multicast acyclic net-
works with delay. The coding is always a bitwise XOR of packets with
equal lengths, and is based on highly symmetrical and balanced designs.
For certain setups and parameters, our approach offers additional plausi-
ble security properties: an adversary needs to eavesdrop at least max-flow
links in order to decode at least one original packet.
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1 Introduction
Encoding and decoding over GF (2) is more energy efficient than encoding and
decoding in any other larger field. Recent studies concerning several new tech-
niques in network coding [1] (Linear Network Coding (LNC) [12,10] and Random
Linear Network Coding (RLNC) [6]) confirmed that encoding and decoding over
GF (2) are up to two orders of magnitude less energy demanding and up to one
order of magnitude faster than the encoding/decoding operations in larger fields
[18,14,20].
The high computational complexity of packet encoding and decoding over
large finite fields and its high energy cost which makes it unsuitable for practi-
cal implementation are the main motivation to seek for coding techniques only
with XOR operations. The first theoretical work was done by Riis in [16] who
showed that every solvable multicast network has a linear solution over GF (2).
Afterwards, XOR coding in wireless networks was presented in [9], where the
main rule is that a node can XOR n packets together only if the next hop has
all n− 1 packets. A more general network coding problem which is called index
coding is considered in [17,15]. In [15] the authors address the coding problem by
proposing coding over GF (2). The encoding scheme is based on bitwise XORing
by adding redundant bits, and the decoding scheme is based on a simple but bit
after bit sequential back substitution method.
The main contribution of our work is a construction of codes over GF (2) by
using combinatorial designs (Latin squares and Latin rectangles) [4]. Its lower
computation and energy cost makes it suitable for practical implementation
on devices with limited processing and energy capacity like mobile phones and
wireless sensors. We will illustrate the construction of codes by the following
simple example.
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??) in Theorem ??. In order to reconstruct at least one source
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Fig. 1. An example of balanced XOR coding where the source sends combina-
tions of source packets (combined as the column of the Latin rectangle). The
intermediate nodes just forward the data to the sink nodes.
Example 1. We use the following strategy (Fig. 1): the source s performs bitwise
XOR of packets with equal length based o the incide ce matrix of a Latin
rectangle L. Each column of L represents a combination of source packets xi,
i = 1, . . . , 4, in a coded packet ci, i = 1, . . . , 4. In the first phase, the packets c1
and c2 are sent, and in the second phase, the packets c3 and c4 are sent. The
intermediate nodes u1 and u2 forward the coded pa kets to the sink nodes t1 and
t2 which decode the packets by using the inverse matrix of the incidence matrix
of L. The sink nodes need only to know the combination of source packets in
each received packet. Note that the max-flow in the network is achieved.
Routinely as in other coding approaches, this information is included in the
header of each coded packet. Since in this paper we use diversity coding per-
formed just by the source nodes, there is no need for updating the coefficients
in the header at each intermediate node. The length of the prepended header
vector is negligible compared to the length of the packet.
The construction of our codes was not motivated by security issues, therefore
the security is not the main goal in this paper. However, it turns out that for
certain setups and parameters, our approach offers additional plausible security
properties. The plausible security properties that accompany our approach are
not based on hard mathematical problems in modern cryptology (for example
factoring of large integers or discrete logarithm problems or on the Shamir’s se-
cret sharing algorithm). We show that if an eavesdropper wants to reconstruct at
least one original packet, then the number of eavesdropped links should be equal
to the max-flow of the network. Bhattad and al. [2] make similar observations
when network coding is implemented so that a weekly secure network coding is
achieved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the notation
and the mathematical background that are used in the following sections. The
construction of codes is presented in Section 3. Section 4 illustrates the security
features of our approach. Sections 5 concludes the paper.
2 Notation and Mathematical Background
We define a communication network as a tuple N = (V,E, S, T ) that consists of:
– a finite directed acyclic multigraph G = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices
and E is the set of edges,
– a set S ⊂ V of sources,
– a set T ⊂ V of sink nodes.
Assume that vertex s ∈ S sends n source packets to vertex t ∈ T over disjoint
paths. A minimal cut separating s and t is a cut of the smallest cardinality
denoted as mincut(s, t). The packets are sent in several time slots, i.e., phases
denoted as p. The maximum number of packets that can be sent in a phase from
s to t is denoted as maxflow(t). The Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem [11] indicates
that mincut(s, t) = maxflow(t). The multicast capacity, i.e., the maximum rate
at which s can transfer information to the sink nodes, cannot exceed the capacity
of any cut separating s from the sink nodes. A network is solvable when the sink
nodes are able to deduce the original packets with decoding operations. If the
network is solvable with linear operations we say that the network is linearly
solvable.
2.1 XOR-ed coding
First we recall that in [16], Riis showed that every solvable multicast network
has a linear solution over GF (2) in some vector dimension. The essence of his
proof relies on the fact that any two finite fields with the same cardinality are
isomorphic. Thus, instead of working in a finite field GF (2n) for which the
conditions of the linear-code multicast (LCM) theorem [12, Th. 5.1] are met, he
showed that it is possible to work in the isomorphic vector space GF (2)n that
is an extension field over the prime field GF (2). We formalize the work in the
vector space GF (2)n with the following:
Definition 1. A XOR-ed coding is a coding that is realized exclusively by bitwise
XOR operations between packets with equal length. Hence, it is a parallel bitwise
linear transformation of n source bits x = (x1, . . . , xn) by a n × n nonsingular
matrix K, i.e., y = K · x.
In [16] it was also shown that there are simple network topologies where en-
coding in GF (2) cannot reach the network capacity with the original bandwidth
or by sending data in just one phase. However, it was shown that the network
capacity by XOR-ed coding can be achieved either by increasing the bandwidth
or the number of phases so that they match the dimension of the extended vector
space GF (2)n. In this paper we take the approach to send data in several phases
p instead of increasing the bandwidth.
Theorem 1. For any linearly solvable network topology with maxflow(t1) > 1,
the sufficient condition for a single sink t1 to reach its capacity in each of p phases
by XOR-ed coding is to receive n linearly independent packets x = (x1, . . . , xn),
where n = p×maxflow(t1).
Proof. Assume that the network topology is linearly solvable. That means there
exists a vector space GF (2)n where we can encode every n source bits with a
bijective function K, i.e., y = K · x. Having in mind that the source s succeeds
to send n encoded packets to t1 in p phases, and the max-flow in the network
is maxflow(t1) > 1, we have that n = p × maxflow(t1) and the sink t1 receives
n packets after p phases via maxflow(t1) disjoint paths. In order to have a suc-
cessful recovery of the initial n packets, the received packets should be linearly
independent.
Based on Theorem 1 we can prove the following:
Theorem 2. For any linearly solvable network topology and for any two sinks
T = {t1, t2} that have maxflow(t) = maxflow(t1) = maxflow(t2), there always
exists a XOR-ed coding for n = p×maxflow(t) packets that achieves the multicast
capacity in each of p phases.
Proof. For the sink t1 we apply Theorem 1 and find one XOR-ed coding that
achieves the capacity in each of p phases. Let us denote by U1 = {u1,i| there is an
edge (u1,i, t1) ∈ E} the nodes that are directly connected and send packets to
the sink node t1. We have that |U1| = maxflow(t), and the set of n packets
is partitioned in maxflow(t) disjoint subsets Y1,1, . . . , Y1,maxflow(t) each of them
having p packets. The subset Y1,i comes from the node ui, i = 1, . . . ,maxflow(t).
The set U2 = {u2,i|there is an edge(u2,i, t2) ∈ E} is a set of nodes that are
directly connected and send packets to the sink node t2. We denote the inter-
section between the sets of nodes U1 and U2 as U1,2 = U1
⋂
U2. The following
three situations are considered:
1. There are no mutual nodes that send packets to both sinks t1 and t2, i.e.,
U1,2 = ∅. In that case find one partition of the set of n packets in maxflow(t)
disjoint subsets Γ1 = {Y2,1 . . . , Y2,maxflow(t)} each of them having p packets.
The sets of packets Y2,j are delivered to the sink t2 via the node u2,j , j =
1, . . . ,maxflow(t). The multicast capacity for the sink t2 is achieved in each
of p phases.
2. There are nodes that send packets to both sinks t1 and t2, i.e., U1,2 =
{u(1,2)ν1 , . . . , u(1,2)νk}. Denote the nodes that are in U2\U1 = {u2ν1 , . . .
. . . , u2νmaxflow(t)−k }. In that case, the sink t2 receives from the nodes in U1,2
the same packets that are delivered to the sink t1. The number of the remain-
ing packets that have to be delivered to t2 is exactly p×(maxflow(t)−k). Find
one partition of maxflow(t)−k disjoint subsets Γ2 = {Y2,1 . . . , Y2,maxflow(t)−k}
each of them having p packets. The sets of packets Y2,j are delivered to the
sink t2 via the node u2,νj , j = 1, . . . ,maxflow(t)− k. The multicast capacity
for the sink t2 is achieved in each of p phases.
3. All the nodes that send packets to the sink t1, send packets to the sink t2
as well, i.e., U1,2 = U1
⋂
U2 = U1. In that case, the sink t2 receives from
the nodes in U1,2 the same packets that are delivered to the sink t1. The
multicast capacity for the sink t2 is achieved in each of p phases.
Note that the proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the work by Jaggi et al. [8] where
they discuss a construction of general codes using simple algorithms.
As a consequence of Theorems 1 and 2 we can post the following:
Theorem 3. For any linearly solvable network topology and for any set of N
sinks T = {t1, . . . , tN} that have maxflow(t) = maxflow(t1) = . . . = maxflow(tN ),
there always exists a XOR-ed coding for n = p×maxflow(t) packets that achieves
the multicast capacity in each of p phases.
Proof. (Sketch) First, we recall the construction of generic linear codes presented
in the LCM theorem in [12, Th. 5.1]. Second, we use the transformation to
equivalent codes over GF (2)n as it was shown in [16]. Then, the proof is a
straightforward application of the mathematical induction by the number of
sinks N . Let us suppose that the claim of the theorem is correct for N − 1 sinks.
By adding a new N -th sink we consider again three possible situations as in
Theorem 2.
3 Construction of XOR-ed Coding
In this section we describe the construction of codes over GF (2). Instead of
working with completely random binary matrices, in the remaining part of this
paper we work with nonsingular binary matrices that have some specific struc-
ture related to randomly generated Latin square or Latin rectangle. We do not
reduce the space of possible random linear network encoding schemes, since the
number of Latin squares and Latin rectangles of order n increases proportion-
ally with factorial of n. Therefore, in our approach we have virtually an endless
repository of encoding schemes that have the benefits from both worlds: they
are randomly generated, but they have a certain structure and offer plausible
security properties.
In order to introduce our approach, we briefly use several definitions that the
reader can find in [19] and [3].
Definition 2. A Latin square of order n with entries from an n-set X is an
n× n array L in which every cell contains an element of X such that every row
of L is a permutation of X and every column of L is a permutation of X.
Definition 3. A k × n Latin rectangle is a k× n array (where k ≤ n) in which
each cell contains a single symbol from an n-set X, such that each symbol occurs
exactly once in each row and at most once in each column.
For generating a Latin square, one can always start with a permutation of n
elements that is a trivial 1×n Latin rectangle and can use the old Hall’s marriage
theorem [5] to construct new rows until the whole Latin square is completed.
However, this approach does not guarantee that the generated Latin squares are
chosen uniformly at random. In order to generate Latin squares of order n that
are chosen uniformly at random we use the algorithm of Jacobsen and Matthews
[7]. Further, in our approach we sometimes split the Latin square into two Latin
su1 u2 u3 u4
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Fig. 2. A 4-dimensional binary linear multicast in a single source multicast net-
work with delay
rectangles (upper and lower), and work with the alg braic objects (matrices or
block designs) that are related to either the upper or the lower Latin rectangle.
As a convention, throughout this paper, the number of packets n that are
sent from the source is equal to the number of columns in the Latin square or
Latin rectangle.
Example 2. As shown in Fig. 2, we assume that the source wants to sen four
packets x1, . . . , x4 to the sink nodes, and that each sink node has maxflow(tk) =
2, (k = 1, . . . , 6). The sink nodes receive data from different pair of intermediate
nodes, ui, (i = 1, . . . , 4). Our aim is all six sink nodes to be able to reconstruct
the source packets that are exclusively coded in GF (2).
Let us take the following Latin square and split it into two Latin rectangles:
L =


2 4 1 3
1 3 2 4
3 2 4 1
4 1 3 2

 .
Each column from the 3 × 4 upper Latin rectangle represents a combination of
source packets in a coded packet ci, i = 1, . . . , 4. Using the incidence matrix M
of the Latin rectangle the source computes the coded packets.
Definition 4. Let (X,A) be a design where X = {x1, . . . , xv} and A = {A1, . . . , Ab}.
The incidence matrix of (X,A) is the v × b 0-1 matrix M = (mi,j) defined by
the rule mi,j =
{
1, if xi ∈ Aj ,
0, if xi /∈ Aj .
Proposition 1. The incidence matrix M = (mi,j) of any Latin rectangle with
dimensions k × n is balanced matrix with k ones in each row and each column.
Proof. From the definition of the incidence matrix it follows that the number
of ones in each row is equal to the number of elements k in each column of the
Latin rectangle. On the other hand, since each row of the Latin rectangle is a
permutation of n elements, and there are no elements that occur twice in each
column, the number of ones in each column can be neither less nor larger than
k.
Note 1. The incidence matrix M of a k × n Latin rectangle is always balanced.
However, the inverse matrix of the incidence matrixM−1 is not always balanced.
Proposition 2. The necessary condition an incidence matrix M = (mi,j) of a
k×n Latin rectangle to be nonsingular in GF (2) is k to be odd, i.e., k = 2l+1.
Proof. Assume that k is even, i.e., k = 2l. Recall that a matrixM is nonsingular
in GF (2) if and only if its determinant is 1 (or it is singular if and only if
its determinant is 0). Recall further the Leibniz formula for the determinant
of an n × n matrix M : det(M) =
∑
σ∈Sn
sgn(σ)
∏n
i=1mi,σi , where the sum
is computed over all elements of the symmetric group of n elements Sn, i.e.,
over all permutations σ ∈ Sn, and sgn(σ) is the signature (or the parity of the
permutation) whose value is +1 or −1. The elements mi,σi are the elements mi,j
of the matrix M where the value for the index j = σi is determined as the i–th
element of the permutation σ.
If k = 2l is even, from Proposition 1 and from the fact that operations are
performed in GF (2), it follows that every summand in the Leibniz formula gives
an even number of nonzero products, thus the final sum must be even, i.e., the
determinant in GF (2) is 0.
The corresponding 4× 4 incidence matrix of the Latin rectangle in Example
2 is nonsingular in GF (2) (Proposition 2). M is represented as
M =


1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1

 .
A direct consequence from Theorem 1 is the following:
Corollary 1. A sink node t ∈ T with maxflow(t) can receive n source packets,
encoded with the incidence matrix of a k × n Latin rectangle in GF (2), in p =
⌈ n
maxflow(t)⌉ phases. In each phase the sink node reaches its maxflow(t).
Following Corollary 1 the number of phases in which packets are sent depends
from the total number of packets and maxflow(tk).
Using M the source computes the vector of coded packets as
c =Mx = [c1, c2, c3, c4]
⊤
where x = [x1, x2, x3, x4]
⊤ is a vector of the source packets. The coded packets
are XOR-ed combinations of the source packets, i.e.,
c1 = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3,
c2 = x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4,
c3 = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x4,
c4 = x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4.
Table 1. Description of receiving coded packets in each phase at the sink nodes
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
First phase C4, C1 C4, C3 C4, C3 C1, C2 C1, C2 C3, C2
Second phase C2, C3 C2, C1 C2, C1 C3, C4 C3, C4 C1, C4
The source further prepends the information from the incidence matrix to each
of the coded packets. The vector of packets that are sent becomes as follows:C =
{(1, 2, 3, c1), (2, 3, 4, c2), (1, 2, 4, c3), (1, 3, 4, c4)}= {C1, C2, C3, C4}. The sink nodes
receive in each phase a pair of different packets as shown in Table 1. Their buffer
should be large enough to store the received packets Ci, i = 1, . . . , 4. The decod-
ing at the sink nodes is performed byM−1. Each sink node computesM−1 from
the prepended indexes. The original packets xi, i = 1, . . . , 4, are reconstructed
as x =M−1c. Note that although our approach is similar to [16], we use a sys-
tematic selection of the encoding functions and we do not send plain packets on
the disjoint paths.
4 Additional Plausible Security Properties of the
Balanced XOR-ed Coding
The work with incidence matrices related to randomly generated Latin rectangles
is actually a work with balanced block designs. However, as we noted in Note 1, it
is not necessary both the incidence matrix and its inverse matrix to be completely
balanced. If we are interested in the complexity of decoding and the security
issues when an adversary can successfully decode some sniffed packets, then the
easiest way to address these issues is to give equal level of security to all encoded
packets. In our approach this can be easily achieved by switching the roles of the
incidence matrix and its inverse matrix: the encoding of the source packets is
done with the inverse matrix of the incidence matrix and decoding of the coded
packets is done with the incidence matrix. By applying this approach, decoding
of any of the source packets requires an equal number of coded packets.
Corollary 2. For each value of maxflow(t) and a number of source packets n
which is multiple of maxflow(t), there exists a Latin rectangle with n−1 or n−2
rows and its incidence matrix can be used for decoding.
Due to Proposition 2, when n is even the necessary requirement for a non-
singular incidence matrix is the Latin rectangle to have n − 1 rows. When n is
odd the necessary requirement for a nonsingular incidence matrix is the Latin
rectangle to have n− 2 rows.
Theorem 4. When decoding is performed with the incidence matrix from Corol-
lary 2, any eavesdropper needs to listen at least maxflow(t) links in order to
decode at least one source packet.
Proof. Assume that an adversary eavesdrops maxflow(t) − 1 links. Since the
incidence matrix used for decoding is related to a Latin rectangle with n− 1 or
n − 2 rows, eavesdropping “just” maxflow(t) − 1 links is not sufficient for the
adversary to receive at least one subset of n − 1 or n − 2 packets from which
he/she can decode at least one original packet.
Another remark that can be given about our approach is that the num-
ber of XOR operations between different packets (both in the source and in
the sink nodes) is relatively high. We can address that remark by using Latin
rectangles with smaller number of rows as a trade-off between the number of en-
coding/decoding operations and the ability of an adversary to decode a source
packet. Namely, the encoding and decoding efforts at the source and sink node
are the highest when encoding and decoding requires n − 1 or n − 2 packets.
In order to decrease the number of operations at the nodes, the Latin rectangle
should have k ≤ n− 2 rows. However, we are interested to reduce the number k
without reducing the number of links that have to be listened by an eavesdrop-
per in order to decode at least one original packet. The following theorem gives
the necessary and sufficient condition for that to happen:
Theorem 5. Let the coding be done by M−1 obtained from a Latin rectangle
Lk×n of size k×n, where k ≤ n−2. Further, assume that the transfer is done by
sending n packets from s to t in p = ⌈ n
maxflow(t)⌉ phases on maxflow(t) disjoint
paths and let the sets of indexes of the packets sent via i-th disjoint path are
denoted by Si, i = 1, . . . ,maxflow(t). A necessary and sufficient condition for an
eavesdropper to need to listen at least maxflow(t) links in order to decode at least
one original packet is:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,maxflow(t)} : Lk,j ∩ Si 6= ∅, (1)
where Lk,j, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the set of elements in the j-th column of the Latin
rectangle Lk×n.
Proof. To show that the condition (1) is necessary assume that an eavesdropper
needs maxflow(t)− 1 links in order to decode one original packet xl, and let us
denote by Sm the set of indexes of the packets sent via the disjoint path that
was not listened by the eavesdropper. This means that for the l-th column Lk,l
of the Latin rectangle Lk×n: Lk,l ∩ Sm = ∅ which violates the condition (1).
To show that the condition (1) is sufficient, let us denote by Si,j = Lk,j ∩Si,
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i ∈ {1, . . . ,maxflow(t)}. It is sufficient to notice that Si,j are
disjunctive partitions for every set Lk,j , i.e.,
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
maxflow(t)⋃
i=1
Si,j = Lk,j
and
∀j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Si,j1 ∩ Si,j2 = ∅.
Since |Lk,j | = k, and the encoding of original n packets is done by M−1, it
follows that an eavesdropper can decode any original packet only by listening at
least maxflow(t) links.
Example 3. We present an example that illustrates the security in our approach.
The goal is to achieve secrecy1 so that a passive adversary is able to reconstruct n
source packets only when at least maxflow(t) links are eavesdropped. By sending
XOR-ed packets on disjoint paths (exploiting the path diversity), an adversary
is unable to decode the message although several paths are eavesdropped. Let
us consider the network shown in Fig.3, where a source s communicates with
two sinks t1 and t2 with the help of intermediate nodes ui, i = 1, 2, 3, and sends
twelve packets to t1 and t2. Packets are sent in four phases since maxflow(t) =
3. Let us use the following 5× 12 Latin rectangle:
L5×12 =


4 2 11 8 12 1 9 5 10 7 6 3
2 8 12 3 6 10 4 11 5 1 9 7
3 4 2 9 11 12 5 6 7 8 10 1
9 10 1 6 3 7 2 8 4 11 12 5
6 5 7 10 1 11 8 3 12 4 2 9

 .
The colors of indexes in L5×12 correspond to the colors of the packets as
they are sent in Fig 3. If the sink nodes reconstruct the source packets with
M−1, then not all packets have the same level of decoding complexity. That is
demonstrated with relations (2) and (3). For instance, to decode x4, x7 and x8
nine coded packets are needed, while to decode x5 and x11 just three packets
are needed. The goal is to avoid this non-balanced complexity in the decoding.
Therefore, as in Theorem 5 the encoding is done by M−1 and the decoding by
M . When s computes the vector of coded packets as c =M−1x, then the coded
packets ci, i = 1, . . . , 12 are XOR-ed combinations of different number of source
packets. Consequently, decoding of packets is done with a balanced matrix, i.e.,
x =Mc.
s
u1 u2 u3
t1 t2
C3
C10
C7
C2
C8
C4
C11
C9
C1
C6
C5
C12
2. Routing of 12 packets for secure network coding when decoding is
5 coded packets
10 11 12
10
12
10 11 12
10 11
11 12
10 11 12
10
10 10
11
12
is as follows: on the first path the source
, C10, C , C ), on the second path ( , C , C11, C
, C ,C ,C12) on the third path as it is shown in Fig.2.
We use three different colors for the packets sent to three
in order to demonstrate the essence of the proof
of Theorem 5. Note that all colors are present in every column
of the Latin rectangle 12. This corresponds to the condition
in Theorem 5. In order to reconstruct at least one source
an adversary should eavesdrop at least 3 links.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an approach that reaches the
w for a single source multicast acyclic network with
. The coding is exclusively performed in GF (2), i.e., it
is bitwise XOR of packets with equal lengths. The encoding
on balanced nonsingular matrices that
as incidence matrices from Latin rectangles. We
offers additional plausible security
if an eavesdropper wants to reconstruct at least
of eavesdropped links
be equal to the max-flow of the network.
work includes intermediate nodes to form
as well as building networks dynamically by
w when the
is XOR-ed coding.
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Fig. 3. Routing of 12 packets for secure coding when decoding is performed with
5 coded packets
1 We use here the term secrecy as it is used in [13, Ch.7 pp. 185]
c1 =x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x9,
c2 =x2 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x10,
c3 =x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x12,
c4 =x3 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x10,
c5 =x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x12,
c6 =x1 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x12,
c7 =x2 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x9,
c8 =x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x11,
c9 =x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x12,
c10 =x1 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x11,
c11 =x2 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x12,
c12 =x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x9.
(2)
x1 =c2 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c10 ⊕ c11 ⊕ c12,
x2 =c1 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c6 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c9 ⊕ c10,
x3 =c3 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c6 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c8 ⊕ c9 ⊕ c12,
x4 =c4 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c6 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c8 ⊕ c9 ⊕ c10 ⊕ c11 ⊕ c12,
x5 =c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c4,
x6 =c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c4 ⊕ c6 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c10 ⊕ c11,
x7 =c2 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c4 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c6 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c8 ⊕ c11 ⊕ c12,
x8 =c1 ⊕ c3 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c8 ⊕ c9 ⊕ c10 ⊕ c11 ⊕ c12,
x9 =c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c9 ⊕ c10,
x10 =c1 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c9 ⊕ c10,
x11 =c1 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c8,
x12 =c3 ⊕ c4 ⊕ c5 ⊕ c7 ⊕ c9.
(3)
Assume that the routing is as follows: on the first path the source sends
(C3, C10, C7, C2), on the second path (C8, C4, C11, C9) and (C1, C6, C5, C12) on
the third path as it is shown in Fig.3. We use three different colors for the
packets sent to three disjoint paths in order to demonstrate the essence of the
proof of Theorem 5. Note that all colors are present in every column of the Latin
rectangle L5×12. This corresponds to the condition (1) in Theorem 5. In order
to reconstruct at least one source packet, an adversary must eavesdrop at least
3 links.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a construction of codes over GF (2) which reach
the max-flow for single source multicast acyclic networks with delay. The coding
is exclusively performed in GF (2), i.e., it is a bitwise XOR of packets with equal
lengths. The encoding and decoding are based on balanced nonsingular matrices
that are obtained as incidence matrices from Latin rectangles. Balanced XOR-ed
coding is of particular importance for energy and processor constraint devices.
Additionally, we showed that the approach offers plausible security properties,
i.e., if an eavesdropper wants to reconstruct at least one original packet, then
the number of eavesdropped links must be equal to the max-flow of the network.
Possible future work includes intermediate nodes to form coded packets, as
well as building networks dynamically by adding more and more sink nodes that
reach the max-flow when the coding is XOR-ed coding.
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